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I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers who maintain that of all 
the differences between man and the lower animals the moral sense or 
conscience is by far the most important. 
 – Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (1871) 
 
The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either 
to the capacity for ethics (i.e., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right 
or wrong), or to the moral norms accepted by human beings for guiding their 
actions. I herein propose: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of 
human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of 
biological evolution.  Humans exhibit ethical behavior by nature because their 
biological makeup determines the presence of three necessary conditions for 
ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one’s own 
actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgments; and (iii) the ability to choose 
between alternative courses of action.  Ethical behavior came about in evolution 
not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequence of man’s 
eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural 
selection.  That is, morally evolved as an exaptation, not as an adaptation.  Since 
Darwin’s time there have been evolutionists proposing that the norms of morality 
are derived from biological evolution.  Sociobiologists represent the most recent 
and most subtle version of that proposal.  The sociobiologists' argument is that 
human ethical norms are sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by 
biological evolution.  I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape 
the naturalistic fallacy.  The isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by 
natural selection and those sanctioned by moral norms exist only with respect to 
the consequences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely 
disparate. 
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1. Introduction 
I will define moral behavior for the present purposes as the actions of a person 
who takes into account in a sympathetic way the impact the actions have on 
others.1  Altruism may be defined in a similar way as, for example, “unselfish 
regard for or devotion to the welfare of others” (Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary, 10th ed.).  Altruism, however, is usually taken to imply some cost to 
the altruist for the benefit of others,2 and this is the sense in which “altruism” will 
be used here.  I will use the term “ethical behavior” as a synonym of “moral 
behavior,” and “morality” and “ethics” as synonyms of each other, except when 
explicitly noted or contextually obvious that they are used with a somewhat 
different meaning.  Some authors use “morality” or “virtue ethics” in a broader 
sense that would include good feelings in regard to others and exclude 
inappropriate thoughts or desires, such as entertaining sexual desires for 
somebody else’s wife or wishes that something harmful would happen to others.  
So long as these thoughts or desires are not transformed into actions, they will not 
be included in my use of “morality.”  Actions that may be thought to be evil or 
sinful in some moral systems, such as masturbation, will not be included either in 
my use of “morality,” so long as the actions have no consequences for others. 
                                                
1 This is similar to the definition of David Copp (2006):  “[W]e can take a person’s moral beliefs 
to be the beliefs she has about how to live her life when she takes into account in a sympathetic 
way the impact of her life and decisions on others” (p. 4). 
2 Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th edition, gives a second definition of altruism as 
“behavior by an animal that is not beneficial to or may be harmful to itself but that benefits others 
of its species.” 
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2. Theories of Morality 
People have moral values; that is, they accept standards according to which their 
conduct is judged either right or wrong, good or evil.  The particular norms by 
which moral actions are judged vary to some extent from individual to individual, 
and from culture to culture (although some norms, like not to kill, not to steal, and 
to honor one’s parents are widespread and perhaps universal), but value 
judgments concerning human behavior are passed in all cultures.  This 
universality raises the questions whether the moral sense is part of human nature, 
one more dimension of our biological make-up; and whether ethical values may 
be the product of biological evolution, rather than being given by religious and 
cultural traditions. 
 There are many theories concerned with the rational grounds for morality, 
such as deductive theories that seek to discover the axioms or fundamental 
principles that determine what is morally correct on the basis of direct moral 
intuition; or theories like logical positivism or existentialism that negate rational 
foundations of morality, reducing moral principles to emotional decisions or to 
other irrational grounds.  After the publication of Darwin’s theory of evolution by 
natural selection, several philosophers as well as biologists attempted to find in 
the evolutionary process the justification for moral behavior. 
 Aristotle and other philosophers of classical Greece and Rome, as well as 
many other philosophers throughout the centuries, held that humans hold moral 
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values by nature.  A human is not only Homo sapiens, but also Homo moralis.  
But biological evolution brings about two important issues:  timing and causation.  
We do not attribute ethical behavior to animals (surely, not to all animals and not 
to the same extent as to humans, in any case).  Therefore, evolution raises 
distinctive questions about the origins and tenets of moral behavior.  When did 
ethical behavior come about in human evolution?  Did modern humans have an 
ethical sense from the beginning?  Did Neandertals hold moral values?  What 
about H. erectus and H. habilis?  And how did the moral sense evolve?  Was it 
directly promoted by natural selection?  Or did it come about as a by-product of 
some other attribute (such as rationality, for example) that was the direct target of 
selection?  Alternatively, is the moral sense an outcome of cultural evolution 
rather than of biological evolution? 
3. Darwin and the Moral Sense 
Two years after returning from his trip in the HMS Beagle (1826-1831), Darwin 
gathered contemporaneous literature on human moral behavior, including such 
works as William Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy 
(1785), which he had encountered earlier while a student at the University of 
Cambridge, and the multivolume Illustrations of Political Economy by Harriet 
Martineau, published more recently, in 1832–1834.  These two authors, like other 
philosophers of the time, maintained that morality was a conventional attribute of 
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humankind, rather than a naturally determined human attribute, using an argument 
often exploited in our days:  the diversity of moral codes. 
 The proliferation of ethnographic voyages had brought to light the great 
variety of moral customs and rules.  This is something Darwin had observed in 
South American Indians.  But this apparent dispersion had not distracted him.  He 
would eventually develop a more complex and subtle theory of the moral sense 
than those contemporaneous authors; a theory that, implicitly at least, recognized 
moral behavior as a biologically-determined human universal but with culturally-
evolved differences.  For Darwin, the ethnographic diversity of moral customs 
and rules came about as an adaptive response to the environmental and historical 
conditions, unique in every different place, without necessarily implying that 
morality was an acquired, rather than natural, human trait. 
 A variable adaptive response could very well derive from some 
fundamental capacity, a common substrate, unique for the whole human race, but 
capable of becoming expressed in diverse directions.  Darwin did not attribute the 
universality of morality to supernatural origin, but rather saw it as a product of 
evolution by natural selection.  The presence of a universal and common 
foundation, endowing humans with an ethical capacity, was for Darwin 
compatible with different cultures manifesting different stages of moral evolution 
and with different sets of moral norms. 
 In The Descent of Man (chapter III), Darwin writes: 
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Brehm encountered in Abyssinia a great troop of baboons who 
were crossing a valley:  some had ascended the opposite mountain, 
and some were still on the valley:  the latter were attacked by the 
dogs, but the old males immediately hurried down from the rocks, 
and with mouths widely opened, roared so fearfully, that the dogs 
precipitately retreated.  They were again encouraged to the attack; 
but by this time all the baboons had reascended the heights, 
excepting a young one, about six months old, who, loudly calling 
for aid, climbed on a block of rock and was surrounded.  Now one 
of the largest males, a true hero, came down again from the 
mountain, slowly went to the young one, coaxed him, and 
triumphantly led him away—the dogs being too much astonished 
to make an attack. (p. 124) 
This is just one of the many examples given by Darwin of animals that help a 
distressed group member.  However, in this particular case, Darwin uses a word 
that deserves attention:  the baboon that comes down from the mountain is called 
“a true hero.”  Heroism is an ethical concept.  Is Darwin using it in this sense or 
only metaphorically? 
 Darwin belongs to an intellectual tradition, originating in the Scottish 
Enlightenment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which uses the moral 
sense as a behavior that, based on sympathy, leads human ethical choice.  In his 
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account of the evolution of cooperative behavior, Darwin states that an animal, 
with well-defined social instincts—like parental and filial affections—“would 
inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers 
had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man.” (Darwin, 
1871, Chapter III, pp. 68-69).  This is a hypothetical issue, because no other 
animal has ever reached the level of human mental faculties, language included.  
But this is an important statement, because Darwin is affirming that the moral 
sense, or conscience, is a necessary consequence of high intellectual powers, such 
as exist in modern humans.  Therefore, if our intelligence is an outcome of natural 
selection, so it would be the moral sense.  Darwin’s statement further implies that 
the moral sense is not by itself directly conscripted by natural selection, but only 
indirectly as a consequence of high intellectual powers. 
4. Moral Behavior vs. Moral Norms 
Darwin also states that even if some animal could achieve a human-equivalent 
degree of development of its intellectual faculties, we cannot conclude that it 
would also acquire exactly the same moral sense as ours.  “I do not wish to 
maintain that any strictly social animal, if its intellectual faculties were to become 
as active and as highly developed as in man, would acquire the same moral sense 
as ours. . . . [T]hey might have a sense of right and wrong, though led by it to 
follow widely different lines of conduct” (Darwin, 1871, Chapter III, p. 70).  
These statements imply that, according to Darwin, having a moral sense does not 
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by itself determine what the moral norms would be:  which sorts of actions might 
by sanctioned by the norms and which ones would be condemned. 
 This distinction is important. Indeed, it is a distinction central to my thesis 
herein.  Much of the historical controversy, particularly between scientists and 
philosophers, as to whether the moral sense is or not biologically determined has 
arisen owing to a failure to make the distinction.  Scientists often affirm that 
morality is a human biological attribute because they are thinking of the 
predisposition to pass moral judgment:  that is, to judge some actions as good and 
others as evil.  Some philosophers argue that morality is not biologically 
determined, but rather comes from cultural traditions or from religious beliefs, 
because they are thinking about moral codes, the sets of norms that determine 
which actions are judged to be good and which are evil.  They point out that 
moral codes vary from culture to culture and, therefore, are not biologically 
predetermined. 
 I consider this distinction fundamental.  Thus, I’ll argue that the question 
of whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer to either one of 
the following two issues.  First, is the capacity for ethics—the proclivity to judge 
human actions as either right or wrong—determined by the biological nature of 
human beings?  Second, are the systems or codes of ethical norms accepted by 
human beings biologically determined?  A similar distinction can be made with 
respect to language.  The question whether the capacity for symbolic creative 
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language is determined by our biological nature is different from the question 
whether the particular language we speak—English, Spanish, Chinese, etc.—is 
biologically determined, which in the case of language obviously it is not. 
 The distinction between the inclination to judge certain sorts of actions as 
either morally good or evil and the norms according to which we determine which 
actions are good and which actions are evil, has affinity with the distinction made 
by moral philosophers between metaethics and normative ethics.  The subject of 
metaethics is why we ought to do what we ought to do, while normative ethics 
tells us what we ought to do.  I will propose that the moral evaluation of actions 
emerges from human rationality or, in Darwin’s terms, from our highly developed 
intellectual powers.  Our high intelligence allows us to anticipate the 
consequences of our actions with respect to other people and, thus, to judge them 
as good or evil in terms of their consequences for others.  But I will propose that 
the norms according to which we decide which actions are good and which 
actions are evil are largely culturally determined, although conditioned by 
biological predispositions. 
5. Darwinian Aftermath 
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was among the first philosophers seeking to find the 
grounds of morality in biological evolution.  In The Principles of Ethics (1893), 
Spencer seeks to discover values that have a natural foundation.  Spencer argues 
that the theory of organic evolution implies certain ethical principles.  Human 
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conduct must be evaluated, like any biological activity whatsoever, according to 
whether it conforms to the life process; therefore, any acceptable moral code must 
be based on natural selection, the law of struggle for existence.  According to 
Spencer, the most exalted form of conduct is that which leads to a greater 
duration, extension, and perfection of life; the morality of all human actions must 
be measured by that standard.  Spencer proposes that, although exceptions exist, 
the general rule is that pleasure goes with that which is biologically useful, 
whereas pain marks what is biologically harmful.  This is an outcome of natural 
selection: thus, while doing what brings them pleasure and avoiding what is 
painful, organisms improve their chances for survival.  With respect to human 
behavior, we see that we derive pleasure from virtuous behavior and pain from 
evil actions, associations which indicate that the morality of human actions is also 
founded on biological nature. 
 Spencer proposes as the general rule of human behavior that anyone 
should be free to do anything that they want, so long as it does not interfere with 
the similar freedom to which others are entitled.  The justification of this rule is 
found in organic evolution:  the success of an individual, plant or animal, depends 
on its ability to obtain that which it needs.  Consequently, Spencer reduces the 
role of the state to protecting the collective freedom of individuals so that they can 
do as they please.  This laissez faire form of government may seem ruthless, 
because individuals would seek their own welfare without any consideration for 
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others’ (except for respecting their freedom), but Spencer believes that it is 
consistent with traditional Christian values.  It may be added that, although 
Spencer sets the grounds of morality on biological nature and on nothing else, he 
admits that certain moral norms go beyond that which is biologically determined; 
these are rules formulated by society and accepted by tradition. 
 Social Darwinism, in Spencer’s version or in some variant form, was 
fashionable in European and American circles during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, but it has few or 
no distinguished intellectual followers at present.  Spencer’s critics include the 
evolutionists J.S. Huxley and C.H. Waddington who, nevertheless, maintain that 
organic evolution provides grounds for a rational justification of ethical codes.  
For Huxley (1953; Huxley and Huxley, 1947), the standard of morality is the 
contribution that actions make to evolutionary progress, which goes from less to 
more ‘‘advanced’’ organisms.  For Waddington (1960), the morality of actions 
must be evaluated by their contribution to human evolution. 
 Huxley and Waddington’s views are based on value judgments about what 
is or is not progressive in evolution.  But, contrary to Huxley’s claim, there is 
nothing objective in the evolutionary process itself (i.e. outside human 
considerations; see Ayala, 1982, 1987) that makes the success of bacteria, which 
have persisted as such for more than 2 billion years and which consist of a huge 
diversity of species and astronomic numbers of individuals, less desirable than 
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that of the vertebrates, even though the latter are more complex.  The same 
objection can be raised against Waddington’s human evolution standard of 
biological progress.  Are the insects, of which more than one million species exist, 
less desirable or less successful from a purely biological perspective than humans 
or any other mammal species?  Waddington fails to demonstrate why the 
promotion of human biological evolution by itself should be the standard to 
measure what is morally good. 
 More recently, numerous philosophers as well as scientists have sought to 
give accounts of moral behavior as an evolutionary outcome (e.g., Blackmore, 
1999; Hauser, 2005; Maienschein & Ruse, 1999; Ruse, 1995; Sober & Wilson, 
1998). Particularly notable are the contributions of Edward O. Wilson (1975, 
1978, 1998), founder of sociobiology as an independent discipline engaged in 
discovering the biological foundations of all social behavior.  Wilson and other 
sociobiologists, as well as the derivative subdisciplines of evolutionary 
psychology (e.g., Barkow et al., 1992) and memetics (Blackmore, 1999), have 
sought to solve the naturalistic fallacy by turning it on its head.  They assert that 
moral behavior does not exist as something distinct from biological, or 
biologically determined, behavior.  As Ruse and Wilson (1985) have asserted, 
“Ethics is an illusion put in place by natural selection to make us good 
cooperators” (emphasis added).  I shall return later to these sociobiological and 
related proposals. 
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6. Moral Behavior as Rational Behavior 
The first proposition I will defend here is that humans, because of their high 
intellectual powers, are necessarily inclined to make moral judgments and to 
accept ethical values; that is, to evaluate certain kinds of actions as either right or 
wrong.  The claim I make is that moral behavior is a necessary outcome of the 
biological make-up of humans, a product of their evolution.  This view would fall 
within the metaethical theories known as deontological or rational.  It is the 
exalted degree of rationality that we humans have achieved that makes us moral 
beings.  Humans are Homo moralis because they are Homo rationalis. 
 This thesis does not imply that the norms of morality are also biologically 
determined or that they are unambiguous consequences of our rationality.  
Independent of whether or not humans have a biologically determined moral 
sense, it remains to be ascertained whether particular moral prescriptions are in 
fact determined by the biological nature of humans, or whether they are products 
of cultural evolution, whether chosen by society or established by religious 
beliefs, or even selected according to individual preferences.  Even if we were to 
conclude that people cannot avoid having moral standards of conduct, it might be 
that the choice of the particular standards used for judgment would be arbitrary or 
a product of cultural evolution.  The need for having moral values does not 
necessarily tell us what the moral values should be, like the capacity for language 
does not determine which language we shall speak. 
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 I will first argue that humans are ethical beings by their biological nature; 
that humans evaluate their behavior as either right or wrong, moral or immoral, as 
a consequence of their eminent intellectual capacities, which include self-
awareness and abstract thinking.  These intellectual capacities are products of the 
evolutionary process, but they are distinctively human.  Thus, I will assert that 
ethical behavior is not causally related to the social behavior of animals, including 
kin selection and the so-called reciprocal altruism. 
 A second argument that I will put forward is that the moral norms 
according to which we evaluate particular actions as either morally good or 
morally bad (as well as the grounds that may be used to justify the moral norms) 
are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution.  The norms of 
morality belong, in this respect, to the same category of phenomena as political 
and religious institutions, or the arts, sciences, and technology, as well as the 
particular languages we speak.  The moral codes, like these other products of 
human culture, are often consistent with the biological predispositions of the 
human species, and of other animals.  But many moral norms are formulated 
independently of biological necessity or predisposition, simply because they don’t 
have necessary biological consequences.  Biological welfare (survival and 
reproduction) is not determinant of all ethical norms in any given society or 
culture. 
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 Moral codes, like any other cultural system, depend on the existence of 
human biological nature and must be consistent with it in the sense that they could 
not counteract it without promoting their own demise.  Moreover, the acceptance 
and persistence of moral norms is facilitated whenever they are consistent with 
biologically conditioned human behaviors.  But the moral norms are independent 
of such behaviors in the sense that some norms may not favor, and may hinder, 
the survival and reproduction of the individual and its genes, which survival and 
reproduction are the targets of biological evolution. Discrepancies between 
accepted moral rules and biological survival are, however, necessarily limited in 
scope or would otherwise lead to the extinction of the groups accepting such 
discrepant rules. 
7. Biology to Ethics 
I will now refer to the moral sense in its strict meaning as the evaluation of some 
actions as virtuous, or morally good, and others as evil, or morally bad.  Morality 
in this sense is the urge or predisposition to judge human actions as either right or 
wrong in terms of their consequences for other human beings.  In this sense, 
humans are moral beings by nature because their biological constitution 
determines the presence in them of the three necessary conditions for ethical 
behavior.  These conditions are:  (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of 
one’s own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgments; and (iii) the ability to 
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choose between alternative courses of action.  These abilities exist as a 
consequence of the eminent intellectual capacity of human beings.3  
 The ability to anticipate the consequences of one’s own actions is the most 
fundamental of the three conditions required for ethical behavior.  Only if I can 
anticipate that pulling the trigger will shoot the bullet, which in turn will strike 
and kill my enemy, can the action of pulling the trigger be evaluated as nefarious.  
Pulling a trigger is not in itself a moral action; it becomes so by virtue of its 
relevant consequences.  My action has an ethical dimension only if I do anticipate 
these consequences. 
 The ability to anticipate the consequences of one’s actions is closely 
related to the ability to establish the connection between means and ends; that is, 
of seeing a means precisely as a means, as something that serves a particular end 
or purpose.  This ability to establish the connection between means and their ends 
requires the ability to anticipate the future and to form mental images of realities 
not present or not yet in existence. 
 The ability to establish the connection between means and ends happens to 
be the fundamental intellectual capacity that has made possible the development 
of human culture and technology.  An evolutionary scenario, seemingly the best 
hypothesis available, proposes that the remote evolutionary roots of this capacity 
                                                
3 Notice that, as I well state later, I am not taking the position known as “utilitarianism,” because I 
am not claiming that maximizing the benefits to others, and to as many others as possible, is the 
ultimate standard by which the morality of actions should be determined. 
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to connect means with ends may be found in the evolution of bipedalism, which 
transformed the anterior limbs of our ancestors from organs of locomotion into 
organs of manipulation.  The hands thereby gradually became organs adept for the 
construction and use of objects for hunting and other activities that improved 
survival and reproduction; that is, which increased the reproductive fitness of their 
carriers.  The construction of tools depends not only on manual dexterity, but on 
perceiving them precisely as tools, as objects that help to perform certain actions; 
that is, as means that serve certain ends or purposes:  a knife for cutting, an arrow 
for hunting, an animal skin for protecting the body from the cold.  According to 
this evolutionary scenario, natural selection promoted the intellectual capacity of 
our bipedal ancestors because increased intelligence facilitated the perception of 
tools as tools, and therefore their construction and use, with the ensuing 
amelioration of biological survival and reproduction. 
 The development of the intellectual abilities of our ancestors took place 
over several million years, gradually increasing the ability to connect means with 
their ends and, hence, the possibility of making ever-more complex tools serving 
more remote purposes.  According to the hypothesis I am proposing, the ability to 
anticipate the future, essential for ethical behavior, is therefore closely associated 
with the development of the ability to construct tools, an ability that has produced 
the advanced technologies of modern societies and that is largely responsible for 
the success of humans as a biological species. 
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 The second condition for the existence of ethical behavior is the ability to 
make value judgments, to perceive certain objects or deeds as more desirable than 
others.  Only if I can see the death of my enemy as preferable to his survival (or 
vice versa) can the action leading to his demise be thought of as moral.  If the 
consequences of alternative actions are neutral with respect to value, an action 
cannot be characterized as ethical.  Values are of many sorts: not only ethical, but 
also aesthetic, economic, gastronomic, political, and so on.  But in all cases, the 
ability to make value judgments depends on the capacity for abstraction; that is, 
on the capacity to perceive actions or objects as members of general classes.  This 
makes it possible to compare objects or actions with one another and to perceive 
some as more desirable than others.  The capacity for abstraction requires an 
advanced intelligence such as it exists in humans and apparently in them alone. 
 I will note at this point that the model that I am advancing here does not 
necessarily imply the ethical theory known as utilitarianism (or, more generally, 
consequentialism).  According to the so-called “act consequentialism” the 
rightness of an action is determined by the value of its consequences, so that the 
morally best action in a particular situation is the one, the consequences of which 
would have the most benefit to others.  I am proposing that the morality of an 
action depends on our ability (1) to anticipate the consequences of our actions, 
and (2) to pass value judgments.  But I am not asserting that the morality of 
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actions is exclusively measured in terms of how beneficial their consequences 
will be to others. 
 The third condition necessary for ethical behavior is the ability to choose 
between alternative courses of actions.  Pulling the trigger can be a moral action 
only if you have the option not to pull it.  A necessary action beyond conscious 
control is not a moral action:  the circulation of the blood or the process of food 
digestion are not moral actions.  Whether there is free will is a question much 
discussed by philosophers and the arguments are long and involved.4  Here, I will 
advance two considerations that are common-sense evidence of the existence of 
free will.  One is personal experience, which indicates that the possibility to 
choose between alternatives is genuine rather than only apparent.  The second 
consideration is that when we confront a given situation that requires action on 
our part, we are able mentally to explore alternative courses of action, thereby 
extending the field within which we can exercise our free will.  In any case, if 
there were no free will, there would be no ethical behavior; morality would only 
be an illusion.  A point to be made, however, is that free will is dependent on the 
existence of a well-developed intelligence, which makes it possible to explore 
alternative courses of action and to choose one or another in view of the 
anticipated consequences. 
                                                
4 For a brief but insightful discussion of free will in the context of evolution, see Ruse, 2006, 
chapter 12. 
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8. Adaptation versus Exaptation 
I will now consider explicitly two issues that are largely implicit in the previous 
section. I have proposed that the moral sense emerges as a necessary implication 
of our high intellectual powers, which allow us to anticipate the consequences of 
our actions and evaluate such consequences.  But is it the case that the moral 
sense may have been promoted by natural selection in itself and not only 
indirectly as a necessary consequence of our exalted intelligence?  The question in 
evolutionary terms is whether the moral sense is an adaptation or, rather, an 
exaptation.  Evolutionary biologists define exaptations as features of organisms 
that evolved because they served some function, but are later co-opted to serve a 
different function, which was not originally the target of natural selection.  The 
new function may replace the older function or coexist together with it.  Feathers 
seem to have evolved first for conserving temperature, but were later co-opted in 
birds for flying.  The beating of the human heart is an exaptation used by doctors 
to diagnose the state of health, although this is not why it evolved in our 
ancestors.  The issue at hand is whether moral behavior was directly promoted by 
natural selection or rather it is a consequence of our exalted intelligence, which 
was the target of natural selection, because it made possible the construction of 
better tools.  Art, literature, religion and many other human cultural activities 
might also be seen as exaptations that came about as consequences of high 
intelligence and tool making. 
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 The second issue is whether some animals, apes or, other nonhuman 
primates, for example, may have a moral sense, however incipient, either as 
directly promoted by natural selection or as a consequence of their own 
intelligence. 
 The position that I’ll argue here is that the human moral sense is an 
exaptation, not an adaptation.  The moral sense consists of judging certain actions 
as either right or wrong; not of choosing and carrying out some actions rather than 
others, or evaluating them with respect to their practical consequences.  It seems 
unlikely that making moral judgments would promote the reproductive fitness of 
those judging an action as good or evil.  Nor does it seem likely that there might 
be some form of “incipient” ethical behavior that would then be further promoted 
by natural selection.  The three necessary conditions for there being ethical 
behavior are manifestations of advanced intellectual abilities. 
 It, indeed, rather seems that the target of natural selection was the 
development of the advanced intellectual capacities.  This was favored by natural 
selection because the construction and use of tools improved the strategic position 
of our biped ancestors.  In the account I am advancing here, once bipedalism 
evolved and after tool-using and tool-making became practical, those individuals 
more effective in these functions had a greater probability of biological success.  
The biological advantage provided by the design and use of tools persisted long 
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enough so that intellectual abilities continued to increase, eventually yielding the 
eminent development of intelligence that is characteristic of Homo sapiens. 
 A related question is whether morality would benefit a social group within 
which it is practiced, and, indirectly, individuals as members of the group.  This 
seems likely to be the case, if indeed moral judgment would influence individuals 
to behave in ways that increase cooperation, or benefit the welfare of the social 
group in some way; for example, by reducing crime or protecting private 
property.  This brings about the issue of whether there is in humans “group 
selection,” and the related issues of kin selection and inclusive fitness, which I 
will discuss below. 
 Group selection based on altruistic behavior is generally not an 
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS).  This is because mutations that favor selfish 
over altruistic behavior will be favored by natural selection within a given 
population, so that selfish alleles will drive out altruistic alleles.  Of course, it may 
be the case that populations with a preponderance of altruistic alleles will survive 
and spread better than populations consisting of selfish alleles.  This would be 
group selection.  But typically there are many more individual organisms than 
there are populations; and individuals are born, procreate, and die at rates much 
higher than populations.  Thus, the rate of multiplication of selfish individuals 
over altruists is likely to be much higher than the rate at which altruistic 
populations multiply relative to predominantly selfish populations. 
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 There is, however, an important difference between animals and humans 
that is relevant in this respect.  Namely, the fitness advantage of selfish over 
altruistic behavior does not apply to humans, because humans can understand the 
benefits of altruistic behavior (to the group and indirectly to them) and thus adopt 
altruism and protect it, by laws or otherwise, against selfish behavior that harms 
the social group.  As Darwin wrote in The Descent of Man (1871, chapter V, p. 
159):  “It must not be forgotten that, although a high standard of morality gives 
but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other 
men of the same tribe, yet that an advancement in the standard of morality and an 
increase in the number of well-endowed men will certainly give an immense 
advantage to one tribe over another.” 
 The theory of sociobiology advances a ready answer to the second 
question raised above, whether morality occurs in other animals, even if only as a 
rudiment.  The theory of kin selection, they argue, explains altruistic behavior, to 
the extent that it exists in other animals as well as in humans.  I will propose, 
however, moral behavior properly so does not exist, even incipiently, in 
nonhuman animals.  The reason is that the three conditions required for ethical 
behavior depend on an advanced intelligence—which includes the capacities for 
free will, abstract thought, and anticipation of the future—such as it exists in H. 
sapiens and not in any other living species.  It is the case that certain animals 
exhibit behaviors analogous with those resulting from ethical actions in humans, 
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such as the loyalty of dogs or the appearance of compunction when they are 
punished.  But such behaviors are either genetically determined or elicited by 
training (conditioned responses).  Genetic determination and not moral evaluation 
is also what is involved in the altruistic behavior of social insects and other 
animals.  I will argue below that biological altruism (altruismb) and moral 
altruism (altruismm) have disparate causes: kin selection in altruismb, regard for 
others in altruismm. 
 The capacity for ethics is an outcome of gradual evolution, but it is an 
attribute that only exists when the underlying attributes (i.e. the intellectual 
capacities) reach an advanced degree.  The necessary conditions for ethical 
behavior only come about after the crossing of an evolutionary threshold.  The 
approach is gradual, but the conditions only appear when a degree of intelligence 
is reached such that the formation of abstract concepts and the anticipation of the 
future are possible, even though we may not be able to determine when the 
threshold was crossed.  Thresholds occur in other evolutionary developments—
for example, in the origins of life, multicellularity, and sexual reproduction—as 
well as in the evolution of abstract thinking and self awareness.  Thresholds also 
occur in the physical world; for example, water heats gradually, but at 100°C 
boiling begins and the transition from liquid to gas starts suddenly.  Surely, 
human intellectual capacities came about by gradual evolution.  But when looking 
at the world of life as it exists today, it would seem that there is a radical breach 
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between human intelligence and that of other animals.  The rudimentary cultures 
that exist in chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 1999, 2005) do not imply advanced 
intelligence as it is required for moral behavior. 
 The question remains, when did morality emerge in the human lineage?  
Did Homo habilis or Homo erectus have morality?  What about the Neandertals, 
Homo neanderthalensis?  When in hominid evolution morality emerged is 
difficult to determine.  It may very well be that the advanced degree of rationality 
required for moral behavior may only have been reached at the time when 
creative language came about, and perhaps in dependence with the development 
of creative language.  When creative language may have come about in human 
evolution is a question that transcends the scope of this essay.5 
9. Whence Moral Codes? 
I have distinguished between moral behavior—judging some actions as good, 
others as evil—and moral codes—the precepts or norms according to which 
actions are judged.  Moral behavior, I have proposed, is a biological attribute of 
H. sapiens, because it is a necessary consequence of our biological make-up, 
namely our high intelligence.  But moral codes, I argue, are not products of 
biological evolution, but of cultural evolution. 
                                                
5 For the evolutionary model of the evolution of language that I favor, see Cela-Conde and Ayala 
(2007), ch. 10.3, pp. 339-353. 
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 It must, first, be stated that moral codes, like any other cultural systems, 
cannot survive for long if they run in outright contrast to our biology.  The norms 
of morality must be consistent with biological nature, because ethics can only 
exist in human individuals and in human societies.  One might therefore also 
expect, and it is the case, that accepted norms of morality will promote behaviors 
that increase the biological fitness of those who behave according to them, such as 
child care.  But the correlation between moral norms and biological fitness is 
neither necessary nor indeed always the case: some moral precepts common in 
human societies have little or nothing to do with biological fitness and some 
moral precepts are contrary to fitness interest. 
 Before going any further, it seems worthwhile to consider briefly the 
proposition that the justification of the codes of morality derives from religious 
convictions and only from them.  There is no necessary, or logical, connection 
between religious faith and moral principles, although there usually is a 
motivational or psychological connection.  Religious beliefs do explain why 
people accept particular ethical norms, because they are motivated to do so by 
their religious convictions.  But in following the moral dictates of one’s religion, 
an individual is not rationally justifying the moral norms that one accepts.  It may, 
of course, be possible to develop such rational justification; for example, when a 
set of religious beliefs contains propositions about human nature and the world, 
from which a variety of ethical norms can be logically derived.  Indeed, religious 
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authors, including, for example, Christian theologians, do often propose to justify 
their ethics on rational foundations concerning human nature.  But in this case, the 
logical justification of the ethical norms does not come from religious faith as 
such, but from a particular conception of the world; it is the result of 
philosophical analysis grounded on certain premises. 
 It may well be that the motivational connection between religious beliefs 
and ethical norms is the decisive one for the religious believer.  But this is true in 
general: most people, religious or not, accept a particular moral code for social 
reasons, without trying to justify it rationally by means of a theory from which the 
moral norms can be logically derived.  They accept the moral codes that prevail in 
their societies, because they have learned such norms from parents, school, or 
other authorities.  The question therefore remains, how do moral codes come 
about? 
 The short answer is, as already stated, that moral codes are products of 
cultural evolution, a distinctive human mode of evolution that has surpassed the 
biological mode, because it is a more effective form of adaptation; it is faster than 
biological evolution and it can be directed.  Cultural evolution is based on cultural 
heredity, which is Lamarckian, rather than Mendelian, so that acquired 
characteristics are transmitted.  Most important, cultural heredity does not depend 
on biological inheritance, from parents to children, but is transmitted also 
horizontally and without biological bounds.  A cultural mutation, an invention 
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(think of the laptop computer, the cell phone, or rock music) can be extended to 
millions and millions of individuals in less than one generation. 
 Darwin’s chapter V of The Descent of Man is entitled, “On the 
Development of the Intellectual and Moral Faculties during Primeval and 
Civilized Times.” There, he writes: 
There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, 
from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, 
obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to give aid 
to each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, 
would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be 
natural selection.  At all times throughout the world tribes have 
supplanted other tribes; and as morality is one element in their 
success, the standard of morality and the number of well-endowed 
men will thus everywhere tend to rise and increase. (pp. 159-160) 
 Darwin is making two important assertions.  First, that morality may 
contribute to the success of some tribes over others, which is natural selection in 
the form of group selection.  Second, that the standards of morality will tend to 
improve over human history, because the higher the standards of a tribe, the more 
likely the success of the tribe.  This assertion depends on which standards are 
thought to be “higher” than others.  If the higher standards are defined by their 
contribution to the success of the tribe, then the assertion is circular.  But Darwin 
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asserts that there are some particular standards that, in his view, would contribute 
to tribal success:  patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy. 
10. Sociobiology’s Account of Moral Behavior 
Darwin was puzzled by the social organization and behavior of hymenopterans: 
bees, wasps, ants, and termites.  Consider Meliponinae bees, with hundreds of 
species across the tropics.  These stingless bees have typically single-queen 
colonies with hundreds to thousands of workers.  The queen generally mates only 
once.  The worker bees toil, building the hive and feeding and caring for the eggs 
and larvae, even though they themselves are sterile and only the queen produces 
progeny.  Assume that in some ancestral hive, a gene arises that prompts worker 
bees to behave as they now do.  It would seem that such a gene would not be 
passed on to the following generation because such worker bees do not reproduce. 
But such inference would be erroneous. 
 Meliponinae bees, like other hymenopterans, have a haplo-diploid system 
of reproduction.  Queen bees produce two kinds of eggs: some are unfertilized 
and develop into males (which are therefore haploid; i.e. they carry only one set 
of genes); others are fertilized (hence, are diploid, carry two sets of genes) and 
develop into worker bees and occasionally into a queen.  W.D. Hamilton (1964) 
demonstrated that with such a reproductive system the queen’s daughters share in 
three-quarters of their genes among them, whereas the queen’s daughters and their 
mother share in only one-half of their genes.  Hence, the worker-bee genes are 
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more effectively propagated by workers caring for their sisters than if they would 
produce and care for their own daughters.  Natural selection can thus explain the 
existence in social insects of sterile castes, which exhibit a most extreme form of 
apparently altruistic behavior by dedicating their life to care for the progeny of 
another individual, the queen. 
 Hamilton’s discovery solved the mystery that had puzzled Darwin and had 
continued puzzling specialists in hymenopteran biology and other evolutionists 
for somewhat more than a century.  In 1975, the notable Harvard ant specialist 
Edward O. Wilson published Sociobiology, the New Synthesis, a treatise 
appropriately considered the founding document of the new discipline of 
sociobiology.  The last chapter of Sociobiology was concerned with the social 
organization of human societies, with the telling title “Man: From Sociobiology to 
Sociology,” and with sections dedicated to “Culture, Ritual, and Religion” and 
“Ethics.”  The first sentence of the “Ethics” section startled many readers:  
“Scientists and humanists should consider together the possibility that the time 
has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers 
and biologicized” (p. 562).  Wilson (1975, 1978, 1998), like other sociobiologists 
(Barash, 1977; Alexander, 1979; see also Kitcher, 1985; Sober & Wilson, 1998; 
Ruse, 2000, 2006), sees that sociobiology may provide the key for finding a 
naturalistic basis for ethics.  
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 According to Wilson: “The requirement for an evolutionary approach to 
ethics is self-evident.  It should also be clear, for example, that no single set of 
moral standards can be applied to all human populations, let alone all sex-age 
classes within each population.  To impose a uniform code is therefore to create 
complex, intractable moral dilemmas” (p. 564).  Moral pluralism is, for Wilson, 
“innate.”  It seems, therefore, that, according to Wilson, biology helps us at the 
very least to decide that certain moral codes (e.g. all those pretending to be 
universally applicable) are incompatible with human nature and therefore 
unacceptable.  
 However, Wilson (1978) goes further when he writes:  “Human 
behavior—like the deepest capacities for emotional response which drive and 
guide it—is the circuitous technique by which human genetic material has been 
and will be kept intact.  Morality has no other demonstratable ultimate function” 
(p. 167, my italics).  How is one to interpret this statement?  It is possible that 
Wilson is simply giving the reason why ethical behavior exists at all; his 
proposition would be that humans are prompted to evaluate morally their actions 
as a means to preserve their genes, their biological nature.  But this proposition is, 
in my view, erroneous.  Human beings are by nature ethical beings in the sense I 
have expounded: they judge morally their actions because of their innate ability 
for anticipating the consequences of their actions, for formulating value 
judgments, and for free choice.  Human beings exhibit ethical behavior by nature 
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and necessity, rather than because such behavior would help to preserve their 
genes or serve any other purpose. 
 Wilson’s statement may alternatively be read as a justification of human 
moral codes: the function of these would be to preserve human genes.  But this 
would entail the naturalistic fallacy6 and, worse yet, would seem to justify a 
morality that most people detest.  If the preservation of human genes (be those of 
the individual or of the species) is the purpose that moral norms serve, Spencer’s 
Social Darwinism would seem right; racism or even genocide could be justified as 
morally correct, if they were perceived as the means to preserve those genes 
thought to be good or desirable and to eliminate those thought to be bad or 
                                                
6 The “naturalistic fallacy” (Moore, 1903) consists in identifying what “is” with what “ought to 
be.” This error was pointed out already by Hume (1740; 1978, p. 469):  “In every system of 
morality which I have hitherto met with I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some 
time in the ordinary way of reasoning … when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of 
the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought or ought not.  This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last 
consequence.  For as this ought or ought not express some new relation or affirmation, it is 
necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time a reason should be given, 
for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, 
which are entirely different from it.”  The naturalistic fallacy occurs whenever inferences using the 
terms “ought” or “ought not” are derived from premises that do not include such terms but are 
rather formulated using the connections “is” or “is not.”  An argument cannot be logically valid 
unless the conclusions only contain terms that are also present in the premises.  In order to proceed 
logically from that which “is” to what “ought to be,” it is necessary to include a premise that 
justifies the transition between the two expressions.  But this transition is what is at stake, and one 
would need a previous premise to justify the validity of the one making the transition, and so on in 
a regression ad infinitum.  In other words, from the fact that something is the case, it does not 
follow that it ought to be so in the ethical sense; is and ought belong to disparate logical 
categories.  Because evolution has proceeded in a particular way, it does not follow that that 
course is morally right or desirable.  The justification of ethical norms on biological evolution, or 
on any other natural process, can only be achieved by introducing value judgments, human choices 
that prefer one rather than other object or process.  Biological nature is in itself morally neutral. 
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undesirable.  Surely, however, Wilson is not intending to justify racism or 
genocide. 
 I believe that what Wilson and other sociobiologists are saying is 
something else, something of great philosophical import that has been stated, with 
characteristic verve and clarity by Michael Ruse in the companion chapter, as 
well as elsewhere (1985):  “To be blunt, my Darwinian says that substantive 
morality is a kind of illusion, put in place by our genes, in order to make us good 
social cooperators” (p. 37, my italics).  Ruse (in the companion chapter) proceeds 
to explain why the illusion of ethics is a powerful adaptation: 
I would add that the reason why the illusion is such a successful 
adaptation is that not only do we believe in substantive morality, 
but we also believe that substantive morality does have an 
objective foundation.  An important part of the phenomenological 
experience of substantive ethics is, not just that we feel that we 
ought to do the right and proper thing, but that we feel that we 
ought to do the right and proper thing because it truly is the right 
and proper thing. (p. x) 
 The deceit achieved on us by our genes is complete:  “There are in fact no 
foundations, but we believe that there are in some sense foundations” (p. x). 
 How come that “selfish genes” move us to act altruistically and otherwise 
behave in ways that seem morally right?  The answer comes, according to 
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sociobiologists, from the theory of kin selection that explains the altruism of 
haplo-diploid insects and much more, as well as from other related theoretical 
constructs such as inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism.  The sociobiologist’s 
argument concerning normative ethics is not that the norms of morality can be 
grounded in biological evolution, but rather that evolution predisposes us to 
accept certain moral norms, namely those that are consistent with the “objectives” 
of natural selection.  It is because of this predisposition that human moral codes 
sanction patterns of behavior similar to those encountered in the social behavior 
of animals.  According to sociobiologists, the commandment to honor one’s 
parents, the incest taboo, the greater blame usually attributed to the wife’s 
adultery than to the husband’s, and the banning or restriction of divorce, are 
among the numerous ethical precepts and practices that endorse behaviors that are 
promoted by natural selection.  The sociobiologists reiterate their conviction that 
science and ethics belong to separate logical realms; that one may not infer what 
is morally right or wrong from a determination of how things are or are not in 
nature.  The sociobiologists avoid the naturalistic fallacy by the drastic move of 
denying that ethical behavior exists as an activity with different causation than 
any other activities or traits simply determined by our genes.  Ethical behavior is 
simply an expression of our genes and a direct consequence of natural selection as 
it adapts humans, as well as other organisms, to their environments. 
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 Evolutionists had for years struggled to find an explanation for the 
apparently altruistic behavior of animals.  When a predator attacks a herd of 
zebras, adult males attempt to protect the young in the herd, even if they are not 
their progeny, rather than fleeing.  When a prairie dog sights a coyote, it will warn 
other members of the colony with an alarm call, even though by drawing attention 
to itself this increases its own risk.  Darwin tells the story of adult baboons 
protecting the young.  Examples of altruistic behaviors of this kind can be 
multiplied.  But to speak of animal altruism is not to claim that explicit feelings of 
devotion or regard are present in them, but rather that animals act for the welfare 
of others at their own risk just as humans are expected to do when behaving 
altruistically.  
 The problem is precisely how to justify such behaviors in terms of natural 
selection.  Assume, for illustration, that in a certain species there are two 
alternative forms of a gene (two alleles), of which one but not the other promotes 
altruistic behavior.  Individuals possessing the altruistic allele will risk their life 
for the benefit of others, whereas those possessing the non-altruistic allele will 
benefit from altruistic behavior without risking themselves.  Possessors of the 
altruistic allele will be more likely to die or fail to reproduce, and the allele for 
altruism will therefore be eliminated more often than the non-altruistic allele.  
Eventually, after some generations, the altruistic allele will be completely 
replaced by the non-altruistic one.  But then, how is it that altruistic behaviors are 
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common in animals without the benefit of ethical motivation?  The explanation 
comes from the theory of kin selection. 
 To ascertain the consequences of natural selection it is necessary to take 
into account a gene’s effects not only on a particular individual but also on all 
individuals possessing that gene, as in the explanation of the social organization 
of bees and other hymenopterans.  When considering altruistic behavior, one must 
take into account not only the risks for the altruistic individual, but also the 
benefits for other possessors of the same allele.  Zebras live in herds where 
individuals are blood relatives.  This is also the case for baboon troops.  A gene 
prompting adults to protect the defenseless young would be favored by natural 
selection if the benefit (in terms of saved individuals that are carriers of that gene) 
is greater than the cost (due to the increased risk of the protectors).  An individual 
that lacks the altruistic gene and carries instead a non-altruistic one, will not risk 
its life, but the non-altruistic gene is partially eradicated with the death of each 
defenseless relative. 
 It follows from this line of reasoning that the more closely related the 
members of a herd, troop, or animal group are, the more altruistic behavior should 
be present.  This seems to be generally the case.  Consider parental care.  Parental 
care is most obvious in the genetic benefits it entails.  Parents feed and protect 
their young because each child has half the genes of each parent:  the genes are 
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protecting themselves, as it were, when they prompt a parent to care for its young.  
That is why parental care is widespread among animals. 
 Sociobiologists point out that many of the moral norms commonly 
accepted in human societies sanction behaviors also promoted by natural 
selection, such as the commandment to honor one’s parents and the incest taboo, 
as pointed out above.  Once again, the sociobiologists’ argument is that human 
ethical norms are sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological 
evolution.  Ethical norms protect such evolution-determined behaviors as well as 
being specified by them. 
 I, however, believe that the sociobiologists’ arguments to that effect are 
misguided.  Consider altruism as an example.  Altruism in the biological sense 
(altruismb) is defined in terms of the population genetic consequences of a certain 
behavior.  Altruismb is explained by the fact that genes prompting such behavior 
are actually favored by natural selection (when inclusive fitness is taken into 
account), even though the fitness of the behaving individual is decreased.  But 
altruism in the moral sense (altruismm) is explained in terms of motivations:  a 
person chooses to risk his/her own life (or incur some kind of cost) for the benefit 
of somebody else.  The similarity between altruismb and altruismm is only with 
respect to the consequences: an individual’s chances are improved by the 
behavior of another individual who incurs a risk or cost.  The underlying 
causations are completely disparate:  the ensuing genetic benefits in altruismb; 
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regard for others in altruismm.  As Darwin put it, the behavior of a baboon and a 
human are similar in that they both save an infant (from the dogs or from 
drowning), but they differ in that humans carry out an assessment, which baboons 
do not.  As I have argued above humans make moral judgments as a necessary 
consequence of their eminent intellectual abilities.  Their judgments, as well as 
the moral norms on which they are based, are not always accompanied by 
biological gain. 
 Parental care is a behavior generally favored by natural selection, which 
may also be present in virtually all codes of morality, from primitive to more 
advanced societies.  There are other human behaviors sanctioned by moral norms 
that have biological correlates favored by natural selection.  One example is 
monogamy, which occurs in some animal species but not in many others.  It is 
also sanctioned in many human cultures, but surely not in all.  Polygamy is 
sanctioned in some current human cultures and surely was more so in the past.  
Food sharing outside the mother–offspring unit rarely occurs in primates, with the 
exception of chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys, although even in chimpanzees 
food sharing is highly selective and often associated with reciprocity.  A more 
common form of mutual aid among primates is coalition formation; alliances are 
formed in fighting other conspecifics, although these alliances are labile, with 
partners readily changing partners. 
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 One interesting behavior, associated with a sense of justice, or equal pay 
for equal work, has been described by Sarah Brosnan and Frans de Waal (2003; 
see also de Waal, 1996) in the brown capuchin monkey, Cebus paella.  Monkeys 
responded negatively to unequal rewards in exchanges with a human 
experimenter.  Monkeys refused to participate in an exchange when they 
witnessed that a conspecific had obtained a more attractive reward for equal 
effort. 
 Is the capuchin behavior phylogenetically related to the human virtue of 
justice?  This seems unlikely, since similar behavioral patterns have not been 
observed in other primates, including apes, phylogenetically closer to humans.  
Cannibalism is practiced by chimps, as well as by human cultures of the past.  Do 
we have a phylogenetically acquired predisposition to cannibalism as a morally 
acceptable behavior?  This seems unlikely.  Moral codes arise in human societies 
by cultural evolution.  Those moral codes tend to be widespread that lead to 
successful societies. 
 Since time immemorial, human societies have experimented with moral 
systems.  Some have succeeded and spread widely through humankind, like the 
Ten Commandments, although other moral systems persist in different human 
societies.  Many moral systems of the past have surely become extinct because 
they were replaced or because the societies that held them became extinct.  The 
moral systems that currently exist in humankind are those that were favored by 
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cultural evolution.  They were propagated within particular societies for reasons 
that might be difficult to fathom, but that surely must have included the 
perception by individuals that a particular moral system was beneficial for them, 
at least to the extent that it was beneficial for their society by promoting social 
stability and success.  Acceptance of some precepts in many societies is 
reinforced by civil authority (e.g., those who kill or commit adultery will be 
punished) and by religious beliefs (God is watching and you’ll go to hell if you 
misbehave).  Legal and political systems, as well as belief systems, are 
themselves outcomes of cultural evolution. 
Postscript: Counterpoint 
According to E.O. Wilson (1992), progress “is a property of the evolution of life 
as a whole by almost any conceivable intuitive standard, including the acquisition 
of goals and intentions in the behavior of animals” (p. 187). 
 Herbert Spencer (1851) was perhaps the first philosopher seeking to find 
the grounds of morality in biology. Spencer argued that the theory of evolution 
implies certain ethical principles: any acceptable moral code must be based on 
natural selection, the law of struggle for existence. The morality of human actions 
must be measured by their contribution to the greater duration, extension, and 
perfection of life; that is, as they conform to the progress of life, because this is 
the goal of evolution as promoted by natural selection. Julian Huxley (1927, 
1953) did not quite endorse Spencer’s view of evolution as progressive on the 
41 
 
whole, but there are privileged lines of evolutionary progress as it occurs, for 
example, in the evolution towards higher levels of organization [more complex 
organisms], from amoeba to animals and from fish to mammals and, ultimately, 
humans. 
 I join Ruse (1995, 2009) in his unambiguous rejection of any efforts to 
justify ethical values on the supposedly progressive character of the evolutionary 
process. “It is far from obvious,” he writes “that natural selection promotes 
progress or that progress actually occurs in any clear definable and quantifiable 
way” (Ruse, p. xx).  I would add that this is the case because the concept of 
progress contains two elements: one descriptive—that directional change has 
occurred; the other axiological—that the change represents an improvement or 
betterment. The notion of progress requires that a value judgment be made of 
what is better and what is worse, or what is higher and what is lower, according to 
some axiological standard (Ayala, 1974). 
 Ruse’s next move amounts, however, to throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater: morality does not exist in objective reality, except as a mirage placed 
in our genes by natural selection so that we may become good cooperators (Ruse 
and Wilson, 1985, 1986). This Ruse had stated before, but he now goes farther. 
On top of the illusion that thee is right and wrong, is the additional mirage, “put in 
place by biology,” that morality has an objective foundation. It is “not just that we 
42 
 
feel we ought to do the right and proper thing, but that we feel that … it truly is 
the right and proper thing” (companion manuscript, p. 30). 
 I rather see it that morality exists in objective reality because our exalted 
intelligence allows us to anticipate the consequence of our action sin regards to 
others and to evaluate the actions in terms of these consequences. Such are the 
biological foundations of moral behavior. Morality is an adaptation that 
contributes to the biological success of our species, but it is an exaptation, rather 
than an adaptation, because it was not directly promoted by natural selection. The 
target of natural selection was rather exalted intelligence, because tool making 
improved the fitness of our Pleistocene ancestors. Human societies have 
experimented over millennia with different moral systems. Those that persist in 
modern mankind are those that proved successful within the societies in which 
they exist. Moral codes are products of cultural evolution, not direct outcomes of 
natural selection. 
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